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sustainable transitions—on how to tailor institutional 
norms and develop networks to meet the heterogeneous 
needs of different typologies of sharing economy initiatives 
in agri-food systems.
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Introduction
The concept of sharing economy is rising in the societal 
and academic debate. Although contested in terms of its 
multiple dimensions and frames (Belk 2007; Bardhi and 
Eckhardt 2012; Martin et  al. 2015), the sharing economy 
generally refers to models of co-access and co-ownership 
of resources, goods and services for joint production and/
or consumption among multiple actors (Belk 2013) which 
involves a reduction of individual ownership (Botsman 
and Rogers 2010; Gansky 2011). Car or bike sharing pro-
grams, clothes swapping, tools sharing groups, accom-
modation exchanges, co-working spaces and renewable 
energy communities have been studied as rapidly growing 
examples of sharing economy initiatives worldwide (Sun-
run 2013; Jurich 2013; Orsi 2013). Sharing economy has 
also been emerging and establishing within the agricultural 
Abstract Despite the proliferation of sharing economy 
initiatives in agri-food systems, the recent literature has 
still not unravelled what sharing exactly entails from an 
organizational standpoint. In light of this knowledge gap, 
this study aims to understand which resources are shared, 
and how, in a heterogeneous set of sharing economy ini-
tiatives in the context of food and agriculture. Specifically, 
this study compares the organization of various forms of 
alternative food networks (AFNs), which are recognized to 
be frugal forms of sharing economy initiatives (i.e., locally 
based, small-scale and with limited use of information 
technology), in terms of leadership, bureaucracy, shared 
resources and participants’ engagement. Data from a com-
parative case study across 18 AFNs identify five sharing 
economy models of AFNs with distinctive shared resources 
and organizational mechanisms: consumer groups; com-
mercial community gardens; as well as network-based, 
privately owned and publicly owned self-consumption 
community gardens. These models also display notable 
differences in terms of their origins, participants’ goals 
and constraints which, to some extent, may be associ-
ated to the nature of their organization. Findings inform 
policy-makers, AFNs’ leaders and stakeholders—espe-
cially those seeking to support innovative models towards 
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and food (or agri-food) systems as well, generally in more 
frugal forms—i.e., locally based, in small scale and with 
limited use of information technology—relative to other 
economic sectors (Heinrichs 2013; Martin 2016). Although 
still remaining a niche if compared to the mainstream agri-
cultural and food, sector these initiatives have significantly 
grown worldwide in the last decade (Goodman and Good-
man 2009; Mount 2012; Si et al. 2015; Migliore et al. 2015; 
Forssell and Lankoski 2015). Commonly studied models of 
sharing economy in agri-food systems include community 
gardens (Cohen and Muñoz 2016; Hartl et al. 2016), food 
swapping (Schor et  al. 2016), food consumer groups and 
networks (Martin 2016).
A critical point in this debate involves the role that the 
sharing economy will play in supporting social and eco-
nomic actors towards sustainable transitions in future years 
(Sacks 2011; Contreras and Snir 2011; Standage 2013), 
both at a local and a global level and in agri-food systems. 
After an initial phase of enthusiasm, more critical voices 
have progressively risen too. On the one hand, experts 
argued that the sharing economy provides citizens with a 
more decentralized and small-scale provision of products 
and services (Gaskins and Stehfest 2010) and opportunities 
for investing in new ventures with limited resources (Smith 
2014). Another argument, from a social and environmental 
point of view, supports that the sharing economy stimulates 
participation in groups; thus creating resilient communities 
(John 2013), as well as a way of designing consumption 
models that address climate change and natural resource 
scarcity problems (Heinrichs 2013). On the other hand, 
scholars have highlighted risks and adverse impacts that 
the sharing economy brings about. Risks include, amongst 
others, a shift towards poorly regulated markets, with con-
sequent issues of taxation avoidance or erosion of labour 
and trade union rights (Gruzka 2015; Martin 2016), and the 
perpetuation of non-inclusive practices, for example gen-
erating corporate co-optation and socio-cultural exclusion 
(Richardson 2015; Schor et al. 2016).
Yet, this dialectics among contrasting perspectives on 
the societal impact of sharing economy initiatives still lacks 
a deeper understanding on how different organizational 
mechanisms may influence the nature and process of shar-
ing (i.e. which resources are shared and how decisions are 
collectively taken to control them). This gap is particularly 
relevant when looking at the wide variety of initiatives 
taking place in agri-food systems, as frugal forms of shar-
ing economy have potential to play important roles for the 
inclusion of a broader range of social and economic actors 
towards sustainable transitions (Heinrichs 2013; Martin 
2016).
To contribute to this debate, this research takes an 
organization theory perspective to compare a heterogene-
ous set of sharing economy initiatives in agri-food systems. 
In particular, this research builds upon three adjacent lit-
erature strands. The first strand includes comparative stud-
ies on sharing economy initiatives which do not focus 
on organizational mechanisms. These studies sought to 
compare sharing economy forms in terms of participants’ 
characteristics and motivations (Cohen and Muñoz 2016; 
Barnes and Mattsson 2016) or the nature of the shared 
goods (Lamberton and Rose 2012). A second strand of 
studies has recently focused on organizational issues in the 
sharing economy, yet missing a comparative perspective. 
For example, Schor et  al. (2016) described the informal 
mechanisms that perpetuate exclusion in food swapping, 
while Hartl et  al. (2016) analysed participants’ prefer-
ences for different organizational forms. A third strand of 
the literature has analysed how organizations coordinate 
actions or decisions to achieve collective outcomes, such as 
co-producing or co-consuming key tangible resources, for 
example in the context of open source software (O’Mahony 
and Ferraro 2007), communities (Jones et al. 1997; Bowles 
and Gintis 2002) and cooperatives and producer organiza-
tions (Ménard 2005, 2007). While this third strand provides 
theoretical insights into the functioning of organizations 
grounded on co-ownership or co-access to resources, this 
third strand has still not compared sharing economy initia-
tives. Taking stock from these works, in this study we seek 
to compare how heterogeneous organizational mechanisms 
influence the nature of sharing processes and, accordingly, 
face or overcome different organizational challenges.
To understand how organizational mechanisms influ-
ence sharing processes in a heterogeneous set of initiatives 
in agri-food systems, this study undertakes two subsequent 
steps of analysis with an inductive approach (Eisenhardt 
1989). First, it develops empirical typologies of alternative 
food networks (AFNs) from the selected cases operating in 
the urban and peri-urban area of Valencia (Spain) through 
an open coding and clustering procedure (Gioia et al. 2013; 
see also section on methodology). As their name suggest, 
AFNs have developed as an alternative to corporate-centric 
and industrialised food sectors (Renting et  al. 2003). Fur-
thermore, AFNs are traditionally networks meant as sets 
of informal relationships among multiple actors although, 
similarly to other forms of sharing economy initiatives, 
over time their organization also entailed formal mecha-
nisms (e.g. contracts, bylaws, formalized tasks) (Pascucci 
2010; Migliore et  al. 2014; Pascucci et  al. 2016). Many 
forms of AFNs, but not all, represent examples of sharing 
economy initiatives (Cohen and Muñoz 2016; Hartl et  al. 
2016; Martin 2016; Schor et al. 2016) since they entail co-
ownership and/or co-access to resources, goods and ser-
vices for joint production and/or consumption. Other forms 
of AFNs, such as farmers’ markets or short food supply 
chains (Wubben et al. 2013), do not involve co-ownership 
and/or co-access and therefore are not considered in this 
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study as sharing economy initiatives. Moreover, the urban 
and peri-urban context of this study suits the urbanization 
trends that stimulated the emergence or design of neigh-
bourhood-based sharing initiatives (Cohen and Muñoz 
2016; McLaren and Agyeman 2015), transforming cities 
and urban contexts into platforms for resource sharing also 
in agri-food systems (Gansky 2011).
As the second and last step of analysis, this study inter-
prets the empirical typologies of AFNs with the theoretical 
lens of organization theory (Grandori 1997; Adler 2001) 
applied to the context of the sharing economy (see next 
section about the conceptual framework). In particular, 
this lens helps the understanding of the heterogeneity of 
organizational mechanisms regulating the resource sharing 
among participants, the decision-making processes and the 
nature of the shared resources (e.g. natural, financial, physi-
cal, and social or human resources) in AFNs. Empirical 
findings from these two steps of analysis—also in light of 
the constraints that different organizational mechanisms are 
associated with—lead to implications for theory develop-
ment in understanding sharing economy initiatives in agri-
food systems (see section on implications for theory devel-
opment) and recommendations for policy-makers and other 
AFNs’ stakeholders (see final section).
Conceptual framework
Debate on the key features of sharing economy 
initiatives
The concept of the sharing economy, as well as the notion 
of sharing itself, has been subject to a wide range of inter-
pretations. According to Belk (2007, 2010, 2013) and Bar-
dhi and Eckhardt (2012), the concept of sharing ranges 
from joint ownership of resources (e.g. gardens collec-
tively owned by a group of individuals) to joint access 
to resources (e.g. car sharing). Co-ownership and co-
access differ from activities like gift giving or commodity 
exchange that involve transfer of ownership. In particular, 
Belk’s definition as “the act and process of distributing 
what is ours to others for their use or vice versa, receiv-
ing something from others for our use” (Belk 2007, p. 126) 
reinforces the idea of sharing as co-access to resources. 
Debate on the notion of sharing has also exposed the key 
distinctive features of sharing economy initiatives to differ-
ent interpretations (Botsman 2013; Coalition 2014; Gansky 
2014; Lamberton and Rose 2012; Smith 2014). The recent 
literature has debated at least six key features pertaining to 
sharing economy initiatives:
1. Collaborative consumption. According to Botsman 
(2013), collaborative consumption refers to consum-
ers’ use of common goods and resources in activities 
like trading or renting. For example, consumers share 
knowledge prior to transfer of ownership of goods and 
services, such as eBay or Craigslist, mainly to save 
time or money and/or to contribute to better environ-
mental practices (Botsman 2013; Schor 2014). In 
contrast with Botsman (2013), and in line with Belk’s 
(2007) definition of sharing, other authors narrowed 
down collaborative consumption as the consumers’ 
act of co-owning or co-accessing goods, such as cars 
or bikes, for a fee or other compensation (Bardhi and 
Eckhardt 2012; Lamberton and Rose 2012; Belk 2013).
2. Pooling of goods and services. According to John 
(2013), the pooled goods and services may be instru-
mental for shared production, such as in the case of 
Wikipedia or Linux, which are based on people pool-
ing knowledge for both production and consumption 
purposes (John 2013). Alternatively, the pooling of 
goods and services may serve the purpose of shared 
consumption, as in the case of food swapping (Schor 
et al. 2016) or car sharing (Belk 2013). Moving beyond 
this dichotomy between production and consumption, 
other authors have recently described the pooling of 
goods and services as a continuum between co-produc-
tion and co-consumption (Heinrichs 2013; Cohen and 
Muñoz 2016).
3. Distribution of Power. According to Botsman (2013), 
networks of individuals or communities experience 
more decentralized control over resources through 
sharing economy initiatives than through traditional 
government-centric or corporate-centric models. Yet, 
recent evidence shows that power issues, specifically 
dynamics of exclusion from co-access to resources, 
may still take place in subtle forms among participants 
in the sharing economy (Schor et  al. 2016). Further-
more, the absence or scarcity of public regulation on 
many new forms of sharing economy may lead to cases 
of labour exploitation (Richardson 2015; Martin 2016), 
and thus, even more power inequality.
4. Small economic actors. According to Orsi (2013) 
and Gansky (2014), the sharing economy provides an 
opportunity for both individuals and micro or small 
enterprises to benefit from co-access and co-ownership 
of resources. While recognizing the potential for small 
economic actors to gain control over strategic resources 
through co-production or co-consumption, scholars 
have also noted that corporations may also gain con-
trol over sharing economy initiatives, co-opt and finan-
cially exploit them (Schor 2014; Gruszka 2016; Martin 
2016). Therefore, the tension between predominance 
or co-existence between large and small actors in the 
sharing economy literature is still unresolved.
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5. Trust among the sharing participants. According to 
Orsi (2013) and Botsman (2013), one of the unique 
features of the sharing economy hinges on trust-based 
relationships among the sharing community. Whereas 
members may not know each other personally (Busi-
ness Innovation Observatory EU 2013), the trust 
towards the sharing organization and its mechanisms 
facilitates the joint access or ownership of resources. 
Yet, scholars have recently distinguished between for-
mal and informal rules to establish trust in sharing 
economy initiatives, and found that most participants 
support the presence of formal rules to enhance coop-
eration (Hartl et al. 2016).
6. Innovative and more efficient utilization of resources. 
According to Orsi (2013), sharing economy initiatives 
aim to redeploy underused or slack resources to create 
economic, social or environmental value. The recent 
debate revolved, though, around whether participants 
in sharing economy initiatives are driven by social or 
environmental values or instead by other functional 
goals (Schor 2014; Gruszka 2016). Looking across 
multiple models of collaborative consumption, for 
example, Barnes and Mattsson (2016) found that the 
efficient use of resources was a key driver for sharing 
participants mostly from a financial perspective, but 
rarely from an environmental perspective.
Alternative food networks (AFNs) as sharing economy 
initiatives
A large number of AFNs are recognized as examples of 
sharing economy initiatives in agri-food systems (Bloem-
men et  al. 2015; Del Corso et  al. 2015), in particular fit-
ting with the narrower definition of sharing as co-access 
or co-ownership of tangible resources (Belk 2007, 2010, 
2013; Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012). Three commonly studied 
examples of AFNs exemplify the heterogeneity of sharing 
economy initiatives in agri-food systems: community sup-
ported agriculture (CSAs), Associations pour le Maintien 
de l’Agriculture Paysanne (AMAP) and solidarity purchas-
ing groups (SPGs):
i. CSA refers to local farmers and consumers engaging 
with one another in a small-scale supply chains that 
connect them directly. Originally, and differently from 
similar sharing economy models in AFNs, CSA relied 
on the sharing of financial resources, as consumers pay 
a fee prior to their harvest and access to products. CSAs 
aim to increase farmers’ financial security and partially 
protecting them from production risks (Cicia et  al. 
2011). Yet, the mechanisms and approaches of sharing 
in CSAs have evolved and became more multi-faceted 
over time, with a wide heterogeneity of distribution of 
access and decision-making rights among participants, 
resources shared at different stages of production, and 
the nature of the rules (formal versus informal) of shar-
ing (Henderson and Van En 2007; Schnell 2007).
ii. AMAP are forms of sharing that widely engage both 
consumers and producers in decision-making pro-
cesses around pricing, production sustainability and 
small-scale viability (Chiffoleau 2009; AMAP 2014). 
When investing their financial capital in AMAP at the 
start of a new harvest season, consumers negotiate both 
price and production features for the share, together 
with the farmer; thus fully embedding consumers into 
the production system (Dubuisson-Quellier et al. 2011; 
Urgenci 2013).
iii. Solidarity purchasing groups (SPGs) refer to groups of 
consumers jointly organized to buy goods directly from 
nearby producers in accordance with fair environmen-
tal practices and social justice (Migliore et  al. 2015; 
Grasseni 2014; Colombo 2012). Relative to CSA or 
AMAP, participants in SPGs generally share funding 
and equipment to transport, store and distribute food 
from farm to the participants’ kitchens (Brunori et al. 
2012). Moreover, as consumers are the initiators of 
SPGs as opposed to CSA and AMAP, they also control 
most of the decisions on the product basket, produc-
tion processes and prices (Brunori et al. 2012). Finally, 
SPGs traditionally share resources through close and 
trust-based relationships, as opposed to rules that for-
malize roles and rights among participants (Colombo 
2012; Brunori et al. 2012). Beyond these three exam-
ples, other recently considered examples of AFNs rec-
ognized as sharing economy initiatives in agri-food 
systems also include community gardens (Cohen and 
Muñoz 2016; Hartl et al. 2016), food swapping (Schor 
et  al. 2016), consumer groups and networks (Martin 
2016).
In these different forms of AFNs, participants co-access 
or co-owned tangible resources such as land, water, money, 
food, and agricultural equipment to a certain extent (Pas-
cucci et al. 2013), thus fitting with Belk’s definition of shar-
ing (2007). As in the broader debate on sharing economy 
initiatives, also these examples of AFNs could be described 
as a continuum from shared production to consumption 
(Cohen and Muñoz 2016). Furthermore, these AFNs have 
so far only participated by small economic actors and over-
all they rely on trust among the sharing participants, thus 
supporting the views of Orsi (2013) and Gansky (2014) on 
their potential for an innovative redistribution of resources 
in the economy. Still, the organizational mechanisms that 
drive the sharing in the different forms of AFNs are diverse 
and unexplored. This requires an organization theory lens 
to understand and explain their heterogeneity.
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Organization theory perspectives on processes 
of sharing
Although outside of debate on sharing economy initiatives, 
previous studies in the organization theory domain focused 
on how organizations manage and coordinate actions to 
achieve collective outcomes (Grandori 1997; Adler 2001). 
This literature is relevant both for coordinated actions 
that are taking place among individuals (Adler 2001) and 
among organizations, such as in inter-firm collaborations 
and networks (Grandori 1997; Grandori and Furnari 2008). 
As such, this literature provides a useful interpretative lens 
to describe the mechanisms that drive co-production or co-
consumption meant as the sharing of ownership and access 
to tangible resources.
This strand of organization theory emphasized the rel-
evance of balancing elements of authority (or leadership) 
and bureaucracy (i.e. formal codes and rules) with commu-
nity (i.e., trust-based) and democratic elements (O’Mahony 
and Ferraro 2007). According to how these organizational 
elements are combined, sharing resources in communities 
of production or consumption (such as AFNs) may vary in 
terms of intensity (i.e., more or less resources are shared) 
and practices. In particular, co-ownership or co-access to 
resources revolves around the tension of ensuring the right 
level of control, via authority and formalized norms, with-
out limiting the ability of community members to partici-
pate and benefit from the shared resources (O’Mahony and 
Ferraro 2007). As a consequence, organizations such as 
AFNs have the tendency to rely on hybrid forms of govern-
ance in which participants are pooling resources and shar-
ing associated decisions and property rights while remain-
ing independent on non-shared assets (Ménard 1996, 2005). 
Actors participating in organizations with hybrid forms face 
a number of hazards due to the difficulties in clearly defin-
ing rules on shared resources (i.e. how to share benefits and 
control opportunism), as well as how to adapt to uncertain 
and continuously changing environments (Ménard 2005). 
Control, adaptation and safeguards in these communi-
ties are instilled and regulated by forms of authority and 
bureaucratic procedures (Adler and Heckscher 2006) under 
the continuous scrutiny of participatory (democratic) deci-
sion making processes, and relational (trust-based) con-
tracting (O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007). The combination 
of communitarian and democratic elements with formal 
and codified authority define types of leadership which are 
often based on collectively recognized merits, status and/or 
abilities (O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007). Therefore, the con-
cept of authority (or leadership) helps to understand organi-
zational diversity in sharing communities as AFNs. At the 
same time, since participation is regulated by membership 
rules, it is also important to identify the level of formaliza-
tion attached to it, thus how bureaucratic procedures may 
influence democratic decision-making processes in AFNs. 
This aspect is reflected in whether communities in AFNs 
maintain a relatively open- and less formalized approach to 
participation, thus acting as a network, or otherwise regu-
late it formally via membership.
Taking stocks from these organization theory perspec-
tives, this study interprets the differences among sharing 
economy initiatives in agri-food systems in terms of lead-
ership, bureaucracy, shared resources and participants’ 
engagement. These attributes are considered as the key 
organizational elements to understand the heterogeneity of 
AFNs (Wubben et al. 2013) and to relate the organization 
of sharing economy initiatives to their potential constraints 
for their development and societal impact.
Methods
This study follows an inductive research approach (Eisen-
hardt 1989) performed in two steps to understand the heter-
ogeneity of sharing economy initiatives from an organiza-
tional theory perspective. As a first step the study identifies 
multiple AFNs in urban and peri-urban Valencia as a suita-
ble setting (Yin 2009) to empirically describe the heteroge-
neity of AFNs as sharing economy initiatives in agri-food 
systems, an open coding and clustering procedure (Gioia 
et al. 2013) enables us to identify the main empirical com-
monalities and differences among the sampled AFNs (see 
results in section on Empirical typologies of Alternative 
Food Networks in Valencia). The second step of the analy-
sis involves interpreting the empirical typologies with the 
lens of organization theory and relating them with their key 
organizational constraints.
Case selection
This research identifies multiple AFNs in the urban and 
peri-urban area of Valencia, Spain as a purposive sample 
(Yin 2009) that mirrors the heterogeneity of sharing econ-
omy initiative features in the context of agri-food systems. 
Therefore, the main inclusion criterion was the fit with 
Belk (2007)’s definition of sharing and—to the extent that 
agri-food systems would allow—the display heterogeneity 
of the key features of sharing economy initiatives identi-
fied in the literature. Following Yin’s (2009) principle of 
purposive sampling, the second selection criterion was the 
likelihood that the selected cases displayed a variety of 
organizational characteristics to achieve the research aim of 
developing typologies of sharing economy initiatives from 
an organization theory perspective. Finally, the research 
continued the process of case selection to reach theoretical 
saturation (Eisenhardt 1989), meaning until the point that 
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the likelihood of finding new relevant elements for the pur-
pose of the study in an additional sample was low.
Based on these inclusion criteria, 39 cases were found 
(of which 20 were consumer groups and 19 community 
gardens) in urban and peri-urban Valencia through a review 
of the academic and grey literature and snowball sampling. 
Finally, data was obtained from a total of 18 cases, includ-
ing 6 consumer groups and 12 community gardens, as the 
remaining groups either did not respond or declined to par-
ticipate. Thus, consumer groups are slightly underrepre-
sented relative to the overall population of AFNs in Valen-
cia. Consistently with the inclusion criteria, these cases all 
fit with Belk’s definition of sharing (2007), yet with notable 
differences in many of their features as sharing economy 
initiatives. First, collaborative consumption elements were 
identified in the 6 consumer groups as they collectively 
organize to perform the ordering of food products as well 
as the distribution and purchase. In contrast, for the 12 
community gardens the collective production of food was 
the main joint activity undertaken in all the investigated 
cases. Second, the differences between co-consumption and 
co-production in the sample were also reflected in the dif-
ferences in the nature of pooled goods and services across 
the sampled AFNs (e.g., land, water, food, money, agricul-
tural equipment, etc.). Third, the sample varied in their use 
of trust among sharing participants (although trust overall 
plays an important role in all AFNs), as the AFNs took dif-
ferent approaches to joint management and decision-mak-
ing. Fourth, distribution of power also varied significantly 
across AFNs. The sharing process were dominated by few 
participants (e.g., owners of the co-accessed land, or few 
representatives with decision-making tasks) in some com-
munity gardens, while in most consumer groups decision-
making and control over the shared resources was widely 
distributed. Fifth, all the sampled AFNs consisted of small 
economic actors, consistently with the key features of shar-
ing economy initiatives in agri-food systems. Finally, our 
sample selection and analysis did not assess differences in 
innovative and more efficient utilization of resources, as 
exploring the motivation and outcomes of AFNs (Cembalo 
et  al. 2015) as an example of sharing economy initiatives 
was beyond the scope of this study.
Data collection and analysis
The empirical research was performed through semi-struc-
tured interviews in March and April of 2014. Interviews 
were designed with semi-structured questions aimed at elic-
iting responses from participants which might shed light on 
the organizational elements of the AFNs and thus enabling 
an understanding of their heterogeneity. Depending on the 
structure of the sampled AFNs, interviewees included gar-
deners, landowners, group members and group initiators. In 
11 out of 18 cases, data was collected from multiple pri-
mary sources within the AFN and, when this was impos-
sible, data was triangulated with secondary sources (e.g., 
written AFN rules, websites, blogs, leaflets and grey litera-
ture). To further enrich the data collection, AFNs’ site and 
participant observation took place in 16 out of 18 cases. 
Consistently with the adopted organization theory perspec-
tive, interviews included four sets of questions concerning: 
the origin of the initiatives; the availability of resources and 
their co-ownership or co-access status; the type of relation-
ships among the involved participants and their decision-
making processes; and the main constraints affecting the 
development of the AFNs. Data derived from interviewers’ 
observations, archival data and field notes was triangulated 
with the transcripts from the interview records to ensure 
the reliability of the interpretation (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 
2009).
Consistently with the inductive nature of the research 
(Eisenhardt 1989), the data analysis took place in two steps. 
First, an open coding was driven by the empirical data, 
that is, without any prior assumption related to the extant 
theory. Second, these open codes were interpreted accord-
ing to the selected theoretical lenses (Gioia et al. 2013) of 
organization theory. The first step of open coding entailed 
both a within-case and a cross-case technique. Coding the 
18 interview transcripts and archival data allowed identify-
ing the organizational elements characterizing each case; 
reaching a total of 68 variables organized in seven empiri-
cal categories (Table 3 in Appendix). Coding entails a pro-
cess of extracting, comparing and modifying the concepts 
as new data emerges (Gioia et  al. 2013). Furthermore, it 
highlights recurrent patterns to further develop typologies 
of cases with similar elements.
Based on the open coding, a multiple correspondence 
analysis (MCA) was conducted to graphically visualize the 
differences emerging empirically across the selected cases. 
MCA allows identifying the key components that explain 
the differences among the 68 coded categorical variables 
(Table 3 in Appendix): the first component retains the max-
imum explained variance among the coded variables, the 
second the second largest variance, and so on (Husson et al. 
2010). Based on this analysis, the first three components 
explain 56.46% of the variance of the system, while the 
first nine components explain 88% of the variance the sys-
tem. Therefore the analysis only includes the information 
of the variables that were present on each of the selected 
axis of the MCA.1 Subsequently, a Hierarchical Clustering 
on Principal Components (HCPC) was implemented to 
1 Experts have stressed not to use the last axis of the MCA—con-
sidered as noise—as it can result in a decreased clustering stability 
(Husson et al. 2010).
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group the selected cases into clusters according to the main 
components obtained from the MCA (for an extensive dis-
cussion on HCPC, see Husson et  al. 2010). The HCPC 
requires that a distance and agglomeration criterion to be 
first defined: in this analysis the clusters were joined using 
a metric matrix distance (distance between pairs of obser-
vations) and binding criteria (distance between sets of 
observations) (Husson et  al. 2010). The matrix distance 
was calculated using the Euclidean distance and the 
agglomeration criteria used was Ward’s criterion, which 
minimizes within cluster variance. The hierarchy was rep-
resented by a tree called dendrogram which is indexed by 
the gain of within-inertia (Fig.  2). Finally, to learn more 
about the variables that characterize the partition of clus-
ters, a χ2-test was run. All the statistical analyses were per-
formed with the “FactoMineR” package in the statistical 
program “R” version 3.1.1 (Husson et al. 2013).
The second step of analysis was to interpret the open 
codes with the theoretical lenses of organization theory, 
consistently with Gioia et  al. (2013) coding process. This 
entailed a second round of cross-case comparison of the 
empirical data between pairs of cases based on patterns 
of organizational assessment from theoretical assump-
tions. This resulted on a template of seven relevant 
Table 1  Resource sharing stages along the food chain in consumer groups (diagonal grey lines), self-consumption community gardens (dark 
grey) and commercial community gardens (vertical grey lines)
The white cells stand for no shared resources and the light grey cells for unavailable information
Stages→ Production Distribution
Purchase 
(or sale)
Consumption
Resources:
Food
Natural capital:
- Land
- Water
Human capital:
- Labour
- Information
- Agricultural knowledge
- Coordination skills
Physical capital:
- Production assets
- Storage/Distribution/ 
Purchase space
- Technology 
Financial capital:
- Investments
- External funding
Social capital:
- Training 
- Social events
- External support
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categories highlighting the major differences across the 18 
cases according to their organizational structures: shared 
resources, level of bureaucracy, leadership of the initiative, 
participants’ engagement, goals, constraints and origins. 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of this second round of 
theory-driven analysis according to the seven categories 
identified.
Empirical findings
Empirical typologies of alternative food networks 
in Valencia
Based on the first step of open coding, Fig.  1 provides a 
visual differentiation of the studied AFNs according to the 
dimensions 1 and 2 of the MCA. The first two dimensions 
of this space are plotted to examine how similarities and 
differences between cases lead to different clusters. Three 
clusters, outlined by the coloured circles, arose among the 
sampled AFN. The top-right quadrant of the plot shows that 
the cases La Mateta de Fenoll, Tramuntana, Per L’horta, 
Algirós, Patraix and El cabasset d’Arrancapins have strong 
similarities. Proceeding clockwise, the initiatives Terra i 
Canya, L’aixda com Eixida and L’hort del Carme can be 
clustered together. Last, the bottom-left and top-left quad-
rants show a similarity among the rest of the cases.
In a complementary fashion, results from the HCPC 
explain the key features that discern the three emerging 
clusters of AFNs (Fig. 2). The outcomes show the charac-
teristics defining each cluster and the six most influential 
variables for this categorization, which are: “collective pro-
duction”, “collective purchase”, “distribution of decision 
rights”, “participatory certification”, “market transactions” 
and “own consumption”. Based on their distinctive charac-
teristics, we labelled the three clusters as “Self-consump-
tion community gardens” for cluster 1, “Commercial com-
munity gardens” for cluster 2 and “Consumer groups” for 
cluster 3 (Fig. 2).
Cluster 1 includes those community gardens where the 
food is produced exclusively for own consumption (therefore 
named “self-consumption community gardens”). These com-
munity gardens are characterized by lack of market transac-
tions. First, this cluster of AFNs produces food for private 
consumption only, unlike the other two clusters where food 
exchange is a fundamental reason for the group establish-
ment. As an outcome, AFNs in cluster 1 do not require a 
certification process, food transactions, orders or deliver-
ies nor a space for distribution or purchase since production 
and consumption are limited to personal use. In contrast, the 
other two clusters do benefit from a certification process, 
although certification remains voluntary and informal. Sec-
ond, a large percentage of the AFNs in this cluster count with Ta
bl
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Fig. 1  Representation of the sampled cases on a map induced by the first two principal components of the MCA. Cluster 1 is circled in light 
grey, Cluster 2 in dark grey, and Cluster 3 in white
Fig. 2  Hierarchical classifica-
tion on the principal compo-
nents (HCPC) describing the 
similarity between community 
gardens and consumer groups. 
The boxes with numbers indi-
cate each cluster
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external support for the coordination of the gardens. In other 
words, an external party such as the landowner or the city 
hall are involved in management and decision making pro-
cesses. Third, these AFNs have formal practices which con-
trol members’ participation. Yet, the members of the group 
collectively participate in the production process and take 
decisions on product portfolio or quality, amongst other pro-
duction decisions. Finally, the sharing of natural resources 
such as land and water and the participation in training are 
key characteristics of this cluster of AFNs.
Cluster 2 includes community gardens based on com-
mercial food transactions for livelihood (therefore named 
commercial community gardens). First of all, this cluster 
is strongly associated to gardeners that have no control on 
the distribution channels to deliver produce to consumers. 
Contrary to initiatives in own consumption community gar-
dens and consumer groups which hold this decision right. 
For instance, members of the AFNs in this cluster do not 
have decision-making power on the logistics of the distri-
bution or the delivery times, but are consumers who take 
this responsibility. Nevertheless, as a second feature of 
the cluster, a close relationship is likely to occur between 
producers and consumers involved in these groups. In fact, 
distinctive practices of this cluster of AFNs include prod-
uct quality feedback and direct visits from consumers to 
producers. Third, the email is recognized as the primary 
communication channel for the market transactions. Last, 
the producers in this cluster are characterized for pooling 
money collectively for the maintenance or development of 
their initiative.
Cluster 3 is composed of six consumer groups. They 
are characterised by performing collective purchase of 
products but not undertaking food production activities, 
therefore having no decision rights over production port-
folios. In addition, the consumer groups do not pool natu-
ral resources such as land or water, but generally present 
a common space for the distribution and purchase of food. 
A key factor that differentiates consumer groups from 
the other clusters is the timing of collective participation. 
Community gardens pool resources during food production 
as opposed to consumer groups where it is most prevalent 
during food ordering and purchasing.
Resource sharing differences across alternative food 
networks in Valencia
Using the lens of organization theory (O’Mahony and Fer-
raro 2007), differences across the three clusters of AFNs 
can be further articulated in terms of the nature of the 
shared resources (natural, human, physical, financial and 
social capital). The sharing of these resources differs along 
the several stages of the process including the procure-
ment of agricultural inputs, food production, distribution, 
purchase (or sale) and consumption (Table  1). The com-
mercial community gardens (cluster 2) are the AFNs with 
the highest levels of resource sharing, followed by self-
consumption community gardens (cluster 1) and consumer 
groups (cluster 3). Furthermore, commercial community 
gardens have the greatest range of sharing activities as 
they share all kinds of resource types from natural, human, 
physical, financial and social. Conversely, consumer groups 
share only human and physical capital. Self-consumption 
community gardens share their resources mainly at the pro-
duction stage while consumer groups mostly pool resources 
at the distribution and purchase stages.
First of all, commercial community gardens (cluster 2) 
are characterized by the sharing of human and social cap-
ital. This reflects the wide variety of skills that members 
bring into the organization. Second, natural capital (land 
and water) are pooled along the complete food chain as 
various activities such as pick up points, lunch reunions 
or other events happen at the production site. Third, pro-
duction assets and technology are key resources shared in 
these organizations. Last, they are the only models where 
money is pooled among members to invest in other shared 
resources.
Self-consumption community gardens (cluster 1) share 
fewer resources than cluster 2, yet the extent of sharing is 
equal at the production stage. Most of the self-consumption 
community gardens have their land divided into several 
plots and assigned to their group members for food produc-
tion. The plots are generally cultivated by an individual or 
a group of people and always with a non-commercial pur-
pose. Accordingly, the initiatives in this cluster present lim-
ited shared resources at the distribution stage and none at 
the time of purchase. Furthermore, coordination skills and 
training activities are generally shared among members, 
while social events and financial investments are not.
Lastly, consumer groups (cluster 3) do not participate in 
the production stage at any level and thus they do not share 
any natural resources. As a group, they do not focus on the 
exchange of information or agricultural knowledge as the 
group members often lack the time to organize or partici-
pate in group events or trainings. However, despite receiv-
ing no external support, consumer groups invest labour in 
managing the purchase and distribution of food to the ide-
als and needs of the group. They are also the only cluster 
focused on the development and use of common technol-
ogy to organize shopping.
Organizational mechanisms and barriers of alternative 
food networks in Valencia
The theoretical lens of organization theory allows for 
further classification of the AFNs on the basis of six dis-
tinctive elements: presence of bureaucratic elements, 
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leadership of the initiative, participants engaged, goals of 
the initiative, main constraints and origin. The application 
of this theoretical lens shows that, within the cluster of self-
consumption community gardens (cluster 1), further differ-
ences emerged in a three distinctive sub-typologies based 
on the use of bureaucracy and authority (Table 2): network-
based organizations (with lower levels of bureaucracy and 
distributed leadership), hybrid forms controlled by a pri-
vate owner and hybrid forms controlled by a city hall (both 
having higher levels of bureaucracy and more concentrated 
leadership). Distinctions among these theory-driven clus-
ters are summarized as follows.
Consumer groups
Consumer groups (cluster 3) are mainly governed with low 
levels of bureaucracy, meaning that relationships among 
participants are generally informal (Table  2). No con-
tracts with legal status, but only norms of trust bind par-
ticipants in a commitment to participate. To ensure the 
functioning of the group, management decisions are taken 
collectively. Similarities in values and ideologies among 
the group members facilitate consensus and conflict-free 
decision-making. The following common goals smooth 
the collective decision-making processes: (a) to provide an 
alternative to the mainstream food system by supporting 
local economies; (b) to gain knowledge on the food origin 
and production systems by getting closer to the produc-
tion chain; and (c) to strengthen the local community. The 
organization and goals of these consumer groups reflect 
their origins. Half of these groups have roots in conscious 
consumers seeking organic and local production, while the 
other half are networks of activists inspired from the 15 M 
Movement (Borge-Holthoefer et al. 2014). The 15 M move-
ment was organized under the slogan “We are not commod-
ities in the hands of bankers and politicians” through inter-
net-based social networks. 15 M participants were citizens 
independent from political parties and other established 
civil society organizations.
First of all, a major barrier of consumer groups is the low 
level of member participation, hindering performance of 
the group tasks to purchase and distribute food. Consumer 
groups have some active members that enable the steady 
functioning of the group, but most members’ availability 
to participate in group activities remains low. The contact 
between the members of the consumer group is reduced at 
the time of pickup of food, which usually happens once or 
twice a week. Within this scenario, groups tend to experi-
ence difficulties in finding certain supplies or suppliers that 
align with their values; to engage new members or to par-
ticipate in food-related activities. For example, some of the 
AFNs mentioned that it was complicated to find fruit pro-
ducers because the fruit is not growing close by. To date 
they are not getting fruit because attempts to find produc-
ers have failed. It is often challenging to find close suppli-
ers that meet the groups’ criteria. Other consumer groups 
find it important to contact food and agricultural experts to 
bring a social component to the group; however this may 
not happen often due to the time constraints. Most of the 
consumer groups are willing to engage new members to 
their groups with motivation and time, yet, they have no 
time to coordinate a campaign to reach people in the neigh-
bourhood. In the consumer groups, the levels of participa-
tion and commitment to the group are limited to the order-
ing and distribution of products.
Second, a significant barrier concerning the consumer 
groups relates to the purchasing of products and meeting 
the minimum quantities to perform these transactions. 
Based on the group members’ values and needs, they set 
different agreements with the suppliers regarding the fre-
quency of buying and the minimum order quantities. For 
example, one of the consumer groups has an agreement 
with a supplier that sells the oil in 20 L cans and until now 
they do not have enough people to reach that quantity, so 
they cannot order. Similarly, this group only consumes 
meat when they reach enough demand to sacrifice a lamb 
from the supplier. The conditions are mostly dependent on 
the group shopping power, which many members see as 
the biggest challenge. According to others, the hardest task 
is to maintain consistency on the products orders, as the 
consumer group may consume little or slowly. This leads 
to situations where consumer groups may not have enough 
volume to demand all the products they would like.
Finally, consumer groups are challenged to reach an 
adjustment of the shopping habits. The times to order 
each product vary and it is not always possible to buy cer-
tain products. In most of the consumer groups, fruit and 
vegetables can be ordered weekly but perishable products 
have different ordering times. For example in one of the 
groups, legumes are ordered every three months and other 
products, such as coffee, twice a year. As a result, more 
organization is needed to make sure that the stored food 
is sufficient until the next order. Other groups have dif-
ferent models, for example, members can only buy fresh 
produce in a closed box model. Typically this consists of 
a box of seasonal vegetables that varies throughout the 
farming season. This shopping approach involves a signif-
icant change from the supermarket model where you can 
choose the product you want and in the desired amounts. 
Consequently, it is often costly for some members of the 
consumer groups to adjust their shopping behaviour.
Commercial community gardens
Commercial community gardens (cluster 2) are also char-
acterized by low presence of bureaucratic elements, thus 
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resembling a network of informal relationships (Table  2). 
Informal structures for joint decision-making and resource 
sharing coordinate these commercial community gardens. 
Though, differently from consumer groups; decision-mak-
ing lies exclusively with producers. Relative to consumer 
groups, commercial community gardens are less driven 
towards political meanings, yet still seek alternative and 
financially viable ways of promoting local production 
through direct relationships with consumers. The founders 
and leaders of these gardens are often a few entrepreneurial 
individuals who have catalysed the attention or interest of 
other participants through their social media, local food 
fairs or agro-ecology courses held by non-governmental 
organizations.
Given the nature of the shared resources and their 
organizational mechanisms, commercial community gar-
dens face notably different barriers from consumer groups. 
First of all, individual participants find it a challenge to 
coordinate their time to engage in production, marketing 
and consumer awareness-raising activities. Since most of 
their time is dedicated to growing activities, participants 
constantly feel that they cannot focus on establishing rela-
tionships and more stable transactions with consumers. 
Given this constraint, participants complain that consum-
ers do not sufficiently appreciate the value of their prod-
ucts. For example, regular customers are becoming reluc-
tant to use the close box scheme based on a fixed amount 
of fresh seasonal vegetables. Moreover, many consumers 
lack awareness and culture and do not understand the value 
of gardens’ products, where they come from, how they are 
produced and the overall story behind them. One sampled 
AFN developed a social media platform to create a stronger 
bond with consumers, yet participants find it challenging to 
constantly update and promote it over time.
As they manage a complex set of activities ranging from 
production to marketing, commercial community gardens 
also face issues of limited participation to sharing activi-
ties. Since their time is mostly absorbed in gardening, 
members lack time to diversify in activities. In two sampled 
AFNs there is excess land that members have no time to 
grow. Some available time could be used to produce and 
distribute key inputs more efficiently throughout the group, 
such as composting. Orchards could be re-organized to 
save water and energy, but members struggle to find time 
to invest collectively. Finally, accounting is an area where 
usually groups lack expertise. Often external collabora-
tion works through food for time spent helping picking, 
although these have more the nature of social events rather 
than a focus on agricultural efficiency. The innovative ideas 
of a few individuals in the groups usually help overcoming 
this barrier: in one sampled AFN, for example, two mem-
bers lead a crowdfunding project that funded the purchase 
of collective goods such as a van and a tiller.
Finally, commercial community gardens suffer the misfit 
of the legal framework for their type of organization. Reg-
istering as an association or as self-employment is often a 
duty that the group cannot afford. Yet, this paperwork is 
essential to insure the group activities, secure the workers’ 
rights and the right to use the land. As a consequence, the 
commercial community gardens are not insured for situa-
tions that may damage the field, work accidents or claims 
for damage caused to third parties. In this scenario, if some 
accident happens, group members are subject to risks and 
their consequences. Similarly, in these groups, land and 
water are usually assigned based on trust, which of course 
prevents significant investments in it but at a high poten-
tial cost of not having any right. Nevertheless, the findings 
show an interest from the commercial community gardens 
to overcome this barrier. For example, one group, without 
any legal record to date, is trying to get the official docu-
mentation that would guarantee their right to use the land.
Self-consumption community gardens
Using an organization theory lens, self-consumption com-
munity gardens (cluster 1) can be further discerned in three 
sub-typologies. These three sub-groups present different 
levels of bureaucratic elements: one of the sub-groups dis-
plays lower levels of bureaucracy (i.e. is network model) 
and the other two sub-groups have higher levels (i.e. hybrid 
governance) (Table 2). Sub-groups with hybrid governance 
combine formal mechanisms (i.e., legal contracts, garden 
rules and control bodies for the correct functioning of the 
diverse approaches) and informal mechanisms (i.e., garden-
ers with enough independence to manage the field, getting 
organized through networks to perform common activities 
and decide on the “food portfolio”, etc.). The combina-
tion of formal and informal features, together with suitable 
communication channels, stimulates frequent relationships 
among partners. These two sub-groups with hybrid govern-
ance differ based on the agents leading these organizations: 
one is led by government institutions (city hall), while the 
other is initiated by small private landowners. These sub-
typologies have notable differences in their goals, origins 
and organizational barriers.
First of all, government-led initiatives aim for a social 
and environmental improvement of the neighbourhoods 
where the gardens are located. In these initiatives, often 
born under the Agenda 21 auspices (Llamas-Sanchez et al. 
2013), the municipality set different criteria for selecting the 
participants. In some of them, participants were recruited 
among various pre-existing (cultural, school or solidarity) 
associations. In others, unemployment or low income was 
a key criterion for selection. These organizations strug-
gle to coordinate effectively due to the magnitude of these 
AFNs, which in some cases reach 300 members, and face 
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resources and competence constraints. First, coordinating 
an overwhelming number of members generates bottlenecks 
in forming and managing boards of representatives, as well 
as enforcing their decisions. Enforcement is a sensible issue 
as members do not always respect the collective decisions, 
and the board has no power to impose rules, nor rewards 
or punishments. For example, in two groups, the board has 
established turns for members to clean common areas in 
the garden, as well as a prohibition on using synthetic fer-
tilizers, but some members do not respect these decisions. 
Second, these AFNs are constituted by a very heterogene-
ous group of people. The participants are often selected by 
government authorities because of unemployment status or 
financial problems. This leads to AFNs with a large share 
of its members having limited experience in collaborating 
as an organization. Despite the large number of participants 
in AFNs, some major resources are scarce, including basic 
infrastructure, expertise from technicians and agricultural 
training on what and how to plant or on how to make com-
post. At the root of this resource scarcity, there are owner-
ship problems. Members receive land and water from the 
city hall; however, they also need complementary resources 
that the city hall cannot provide consistently. At the same 
time, members feel ownership over the land that they use 
to grow their food, despite that it has only been temporarily 
borrowed for its use. This creates a negative impact on their 
participation because they do not perceive risks of having 
that land removed, according to some interviewed members.
Second, privately owned initiatives are more focused on 
financial benefits collected from rentals of land (plots) and 
most include an educational component. The founders are 
mostly land owners seeking a better use of their resources: 
some of them set up the initiative when they retired from 
their job, while others shifted towards a community-based 
model when finding that their agricultural production was 
not profitable enough. These organizations face the oppo-
site problem to government-led initiatives. They generally 
have low levels of participation both in numbers and level 
of member involvement. Members often have jobs and fam-
ilies in the city so they struggle to devote sufficient time 
to grow food. At the same time, some groups have expe-
rienced tensions between members and supporting garden-
ers: since the land is rented from a private, some members 
felt entitled to constantly receive support from gardeners, 
who instead are available only for a limited time. This chal-
lenge arises also because of discussions on how land owner 
and members share risk. For example, members experi-
enced the driest season since the establishment of the gar-
dens in 2012, with no rain for six months and warm winds 
contributing to worsening soil conditions. At the same 
time, water supply for irrigation was very inconsistent.
A third and final sub-typology of self-consumption com-
munity garden entails network governance: these AFNs do 
not present legal contracts and are based on trust among 
members to participate and manage the group operations. 
Moreover, some of the initiatives pertaining to this sub-cat-
egory present their own statutes and standards jointly cre-
ated by the members to ensure garden prosperity and group 
functioning. In this case, consumers and producers blend 
in taking decision-making responsibilities since the actors 
involved are citizens that usually perform both roles. Mem-
bers share common objectives to support social and environ-
mental transitions by strengthening social cohesion, recovery 
of degraded urban land and provision of an educational and 
interactive space. These network-based community gardens 
for self-consumption are based on a form of self-organiza-
tion: members themselves, through informal conversations, 
decision-making processes and emerging routines, decide 
how to govern. In some cases, a voluntary group of people 
took responsibility to establish informal rules for the other 
participants, in agreement with the rest of the group. The 
self-organizing nature of this typology of community gar-
dens creates, first of all, issues in organizing procurement of 
resources. The provision of fundamental resources is at times 
improvised. In one AFN, members brought and planted the 
seedlings they had available without planning across the gar-
den, while one member voluntarily installed water pipes for 
drip irrigation. Also composting was reliant on few mem-
bers producing it. This improvisation creates a sense of reci-
procity among members, yet also some uncertainty on the 
conditions and inputs necessary to grow the garden. Since 
participation is strongly fuelled by self-motivation and mem-
bers’ alignment in goals, when members experience drops 
in energy and enthusiasm the entire garden organization is 
at risk of collapse. Finally, these network-based community 
gardens often experience conflicts arising on the land access 
and excludability rights with external parties. Since there is 
no formal documentation guaranteeing exclusive use of the 
land by the public administration, some AFNs experience 
issues with external people accessing the land.
Implications for theory development
This research aims to compare and systematically charac-
terise AFNs as sharing economy initiatives in the agri-food 
sector in terms of which and how resources are shared. By 
taking such an organization theory perspective and applying 
it to the case of AFNs in the urban and peri-urban area of 
Valencia, this study sheds light on the heterogeneity of shar-
ing economy initiatives in the agri-food sector. Understand-
ing this organizational heterogeneity, and associating it with 
their origins and constraints, helps to further articulate the 
debate on the governance, effects and risks of sharing econ-
omy. In particular, these insights nuance the debate on the 
sharing economy beyond an antagonism between enthusi-
asts and critics towards a reflection on which organizational 
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models may be more or less suitable given the goals, history 
and resources at hand of their members.
In terms of which resources are shared, findings confirm 
that participants in AFNs shared heterogeneous resources 
at different stages of the process linking production and 
consumption activities. Some AFNs focused on sharing 
resources only at specific stages of the food value chain. For 
example, consumer groups are unique in sharing storage/
distribution space and technology only during their food 
procurement and consumption stages. Furthermore, self-
consumption community gardens focused on sharing all 
the resources needed to participants at the production stage, 
including the distribution of the needed agricultural inputs. 
Conversely, commercial community gardens required par-
ticipants to share resources over a larger span of activities, 
from production to distribution and marketing. To some 
extent, the goals and history of these AFNs relates to and 
may explain this resource-sharing. AFNs that focus their 
resource-sharing only in storage/distribution (consumer 
groups) or in production (self-consumption community 
gardens) emerged mostly from social initiatives and move-
ments, thus with non-market goals such as environmental 
sustainability, community development or poverty eradi-
cation. As such, members are mostly engaged in focusing 
their shared resources in few activities. Conversely, AFNs 
that broaden their resource-sharing to multiple stages of 
production, distribution and storage (commercial commu-
nity gardens) emerge with a dual commercial purpose, link-
ing two parties (i.e., landowners and a community of land 
renters) seeking also a market advantage from this transac-
tion. In this case, members engage in a more complex and 
heterogeneous range of activities with a stronger expecta-
tion of gaining a market return than in other AFNs.
From a theoretical standpoint, this analysis on which 
resources are shared tells us that it may be appropriate to 
explain the emergence and establishment of sharing econ-
omy models based on which resources are shared (funds, 
labour/time, space, equipment at different stages of a value 
chain) along with who their members are (consumers ver-
sus producers; Cohen and Muñoz 2016) or what they want 
(Barnes and Mattsson 2016). This distinction demonstrates 
that the sharing economy cut across the stereotypical dis-
tinction between producers and consumers, as consumers 
engage in sharing resources for production and vice versa. 
Moreover, sharing economy models cut also across the dis-
tinction between market value versus social value creation; 
instead, members in different AFNs invest resources to dif-
ferent ranges of activities with corresponding expectations 
of market returns. Looking specifically at the agri-food sec-
tor, this distinction may help with characterizing the dif-
ferences and the evolution of AFNs Indeed, typologies of 
AFNs such as CSAs, AMAPs and SPGs, even professing 
similar goals and motivations (Renting et al. 2003; Hatano 
2008; Tregear 2011; Cembalo et al. 2015), may engage in 
significantly different models of resource-sharing, with 
consequences on their members’ participation and welfare.
In terms of how resources are shared, findings confirm 
that informal mechanisms prevail in the governance of 
sharing economy organizations (Lagane 2015). In most 
of the sampled AFNs, although to different extents, com-
munitarian elements of trust and reciprocity grounded on 
common values are used as mechanisms to regulate the 
resource-sharing. Yet, some AFNs (i.e., self-consumption 
community gardens initiative by private owners and the 
municipality) have more bureaucratic elements (i.e. formal 
laws, procedures, committees) than others in regulating the 
sharing process. Importantly, the presence of these bureau-
cratic elements seems to relate to the specific origins and 
size of their organizations. First, members in hybrid AFNs 
(i.e. with some bureaucratic elements blended with com-
munitarian ones) have not chosen each other in pursuing 
community garden activities. Instead, they have entered 
into a membership based on a bilateral linkage with the 
leader of the initiative (i.e. respectively the municipality 
and the landowner). Second, perhaps given these origins 
or the stage of evolution of these AFNs, these hybrid mod-
els entail a larger number of participants which are harder 
to regulate only based on trust and reciprocity principles. 
Conversely, network-based models (i.e., with low or no 
presence of bureaucracy) such as consumer groups and 
commercial community gardens seem to be moved mostly 
by community development, political and environmental 
goals. These initiatives usually originate from smaller, self-
organized groups of individuals sharing the same values 
and motivations already before the start of the AFNs, and 
pooling their time and skills (in addition to other resources) 
to attract other participants to the AFNs. Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, then, AFNs with different levels of bureaucracy, 
shared resources and origins also face different organiza-
tional barriers. On the one hand, AFNs with participants 
not bound in pre-existing networks or through common 
values often face issues of conflicting motivations among 
members, limited active engagement and lack of coordina-
tion. On the other hand, AFNs based on pre-existing net-
works and common values have to address issues of limited 
time and resources, as well as difficulties in attracting new 
members and changing consumption habits.
Disentangling on how resources are shared from an organ-
ization standpoint contributes to the literature on AFNs and, 
beyond the agricultural and food sector, on the organization 
of sharing economy models. So far only few studies focused 
on the internal organization of AFNs (Murtagh 2010; Albre-
cht et al. 2016), while mostly focusing on external linkages of 
AFNs with implications for society and regional development 
(Holloway et al. 2007; Tregear 2011; Veen et al. 2012). The 
strong or even exclusive presence of communitarian elements 
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in some AFNs show similarities with SPGs and AMAP ini-
tiatives in other contexts (Dubuisson-Quellier et  al. 2011; 
Pascucci et  al. 2013, 2016), and explain their organization 
based on their origin and/or relatively small number of mem-
bers. Looking beyond the agricultural and food sector, the 
pattern linking smaller-size and communitarian AFNs may 
explain why participants in large sharing economy models 
may prefer formal regulatory procedures (Hartl et al. 2016) or 
feel excluded when these formal elements are missing (Schor 
et al. 2016). As such, this organization lens helps positioning 
AFNs within the broader spectrum of sharing economy mod-
els (Lamberton and Rose 2012; Botsman 2013; Gansky 2014; 
Smith 2014). First of all, the cases of Valencia confirm that 
AFNs reflect a narrower meaning of sharing—meant as infor-
mal co-access rather than co-ownership of tangible resource 
(Belk 2007)—relative to Botsman (2013). Furthermore, 
AFNs in Valencia feature a broader distribution of power 
among members: when the number of AFNs’ members grow, 
then bureaucratic elements are often developed to maintain 
such a broad power distribution. Therefore, these results seem 
to suggest that AFNs as sharing economy models in today’s 
agricultural and food sector are less subject to negative impli-
cations such as labour rights reduction (Richardson 2015), 
subtle reproduction of social exclusion (Schor 2014) and cor-
porate co-optation (Martin 2016).
Recommendations for policy-makers and leaders 
in alternative food networks
This empirical analysis on which and how resources are 
shared in AFNs leads to recommendations to policy-mak-
ers, AFN members and their stakeholders that, through 
the choice or blending of communitarian and bureaucratic 
elements, may influence their future evolution and diffu-
sion. Of course, these recommendations need to take into 
account the limitations of this empirical study, that is, its 
context specificity and the limited exploration of networks 
outside and across AFNs.
While AFNs are emerging and establishing as phenom-
enon in urban and peri-urban areas, the lack of integration 
of these activities in a policy framework may constitute a 
significant constraint for their development of appropri-
ate bureaucratic elements as they grow in size and number. 
Some community gardens, for example, occupy degraded 
urban land to start their initiatives. Insecure property rights 
and back-door strategies for accessing land can lead to 
long struggles and conflicts between landowners (generally 
banks and/or construction companies) and AFN members, 
and even among participants as the AFNs grow. While the 
EU is taking measures to regulate the sharing economy 
organizations with commercial purposes (e.g., introducing 
and adapting legislation to the context of rapidly growing 
enterprises such as Zipcar and Airbnb), the regulation on 
AFNs as smaller-scale and local forms of sharing economy 
remain below policy sightline. It might be a strategic point 
for policy-makers at EU, national and local levels to regulate 
and/or support AFNs through legislation that recognizes the 
right of citizens to access and formally regulate unused and 
degraded land with the purpose of food production. Yet, 
the wide heterogeneity of AFNs’ organizational forms and 
goals challenges the development of legislation for AFNs. 
Given this heterogeneity, it is advisable that policy-makers 
design a tailored approach in defining this formal regula-
tion. For example, policy-makers may support the develop-
ment of participatory platforms or communities of practice 
(Waddell et al. 2013) that facilitate policy changes with the 
involvement of the civil society at multiple levels (Waddell 
et  al. 2015), as the experience of Agenda 21 has demon-
strated also in the case of Valencia (PAT 2014).
Furthermore, the findings of this research draw upon rec-
ommendations for participants involved in AFNs’ activities, 
as well as external stakeholders seeking to support AFNs’ 
organizational learning and change processes. Overall, par-
ticipants in AFNs should strengthen inter-group learning and 
cross-group network building similar to what Beckie et  al. 
(2012) found in the case of Canada. This would stimulate 
knowledge flows among groups with similar goals to share 
suitable organizational practices and solutions against com-
mon constraints. For example, findings show that different 
AFNs  (e.g. commercial community gardens and consumer 
groups) may find strong resource and organizational comple-
mentarities with each other. Last, there is great need to inform 
citizens on the extent to which AFNs contribute in support-
ing local economies, sustainable food practices and commu-
nity building. Ideally, current AFN participants may be best 
positioned to create these inter-group networks tailored to the 
needs of their AFNs. Yet, given the time and resource scar-
city faced by many AFNs, universities (Dentoni and Bitzer 
2015) and other knowledge brokers (Dicecca et al. 2016) may 
play critical roles as intermediaries among multiple AFNs or 
between AFNs and governments at multiple levels.
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